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LOCAL PERCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AND MIGRATION 
PATTERNS IN MALÉ, MALDIVES 
 
 
Abstract 
For the last few decades, Maldives has been seen as being at the forefront of addressing climate 
change impacts. The low elevation of the islands makes them vulnerable to slow-onset hazards, 
such as coastal erosion, sea-level rise, salinity intrusion, and change in monsoon patterns and hence 
rainfall. Consequently, migration has long been discussed as an adaptation strategy for the 
population. This study covers outcomes from our field research conducted among islanders in Malé, 
the capital of Maldives, in 2013. It contributes empirical evidence toward understanding complex 
relations among environmental challenges, climate change, and migration. We set up two main 
research questions. The first question explored islanders’ perceptions of impacts of climatic 
variability in recent years and possible impacts of future climate change. The second question 
probed whether out-migration from the islands might be considered to be an adaptation strategy and 
whether the islanders were willing to move outside Maldives due to projected climate change 
impacts. We conducted our field research in the capital Malé and nearby residential islands, using 
quantitative questionnaires with local respondents (N=347). Our results suggest that, besides a set 
of actually experienced environmental and climate challenges, slow-onset climate change impacts 
such as sea-level rise are perceived as being one of the key factors affecting Maldivian society and 
livelihoods. More then 50% of respondents perceive future sea-level rise to be a serious challenge at 
the national level and they accept that migration from islands to other countries might be a potential 
option. Conversely, from the individual perspective, sea-level rise is not perceived by the local 
population as being one of their own important challenges. The reason is that many other factors—
cultural, religious, economic, and social—play an important role in decision-making about 
migrating or not. 
Key words: climate change impacts, Maldives, islanders, risk management, environmental 
inequality, adaptation, migration, quantitative survey 
 
1. Introduction 
For over 25 years, the low-lying archipelago of Maldives in the Indian Ocean has been recognised 
as sitting at the forefront of being vulnerable to and addressing climate change impacts, notably 
coastal erosion, sea-level rise, salinity intrusion, and changes in monsoon patterns leading to floods 
and droughts (Fulu 2007; Ghina 2003; IOM 2015; Kothari 2014; Sathiendrakumar 1996; Shaig 
2006; World Bank 2010). The country was the site of the Small States Conference on Sea Level 
Rise which ran from 14-18 November 1989 ending with the Malé Declaration on Global Warming 
and Sea Level Rise. In the run-up to this meeting, UNEP had launched the Ocean and Coastal 
Areas Programme Activity Centre (OCA/PAC) to assess potential impacts of climate change and to 
assist national governments in identifying and implementing sustainable policy options and 
adaptation measures. 
Maldives received special attention as an in-depth case study, with Pernetta and Sestini (1989) 
identifying several key environmental issues, including climate change risks. Since then, these 
problems and attention to them have been intensifying (Alexander and Mercer 2012; Arnall and 
Kothari 2015; Baldacchino and Kelman 2014; Fulu 2007; Ghina 2003; Kothari 2014; MHAHE 
2001; Sathiendrakumar 1996; Shaig 2006). In particular, the islands display unstable morphology 
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shown by the islands’ sizes, shapes, elevations, and positions on reef platforms changing over time 
(Fulu 2007; Ghina 2003; MEEW 2007; Shaig 2006). According to IPCC (2013-2014), sea-level rise 
projections are 0.3-1.0 m globally by 2100 over a range of emission scenarios. Such sea-level rise 
would significantly damage Maldives’ economy, particularly the tourism and fishing sectors on 
which it relies; e.g., the direct contribution of the travel and tourism sector to GDP in 2013 was 
48% which rises to 95% when indirect effects such as supply chains are considered (WTTC 2014). 
Yet island countries—not just Maldives, but many others examined in the literature—display not 
only vulnerability to challenges including climate change impacts, but also ways of dealing with 
those impacts (e.g. Gaillard 2007; Lewis 1999; Lewis 2009; Spillius 1957). In implementing 
adaptation measures, human migration is frequently viewed as a potential strategy, particularly in 
the context of other factors such as development aid and remittances (Felli and Castree 2012; 
Foresight 2011; King and Connell 1999; Lewis 1999). In-country migration and resettlement 
schemes have been common trends over the last several decades in many small islands in the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans (Bedford and Hugo 2012; Mimura et al. 2007). 
In fact, islanders have always migrated for livelihood, social, environmental, security, and other 
reasons (Bedford and Hugo 2012; Kelman et al. 2015; King and Connell 1999). There has always 
been a diversity of migration typologies; for instance, for a compilation of environmental migration 
typologies, see Stojanov et al. (2014). As the relationship between climate change and migration 
receives increasing attention (Black et al. 2011b; Felli and Castree 2012; Foresight 2011; Myers 
1993; Piguet 2008), it is becoming clearer that one single factor is rarely a sufficient reason for 
migrating. Migration causes are usually multi-faceted, with climate change adding to already 
increasing levels and complexities of population mobility (de Sherbinin et al. 2011; Felli and 
Castree 2012; Foresight 2011; Hugo 2011). 
In order to understand the scope and impact of climate change on mobility choices, empirical 
studies examining motivations for migration have been increasing, aiming to disaggregate the 
factors and to provide empirical evidence regarding migrants’ perceptions and explanations for their 
migration choices. Examples are these focusing on migration within and from drought-affected 
areas (Henry et al. 2004; Rain 1999); migration-related interests in the context of projected sea-
level rise from small island communities (Kelman 2015; Kothari 2014); and migration responses to 
floods and storms (de Sherbinin et al. 2011; McLeman and Hunter 2010). Often, terms such as 
“climate refugees” or “climate change refugees” are used, but neither phrase fits robustly into a 
scientific framework and they have been criticized as being inadequate, politically motivated, and 
artificially constructed (Bettini 2013; Hartmann 2010; Kelman 2015; Nicholson 2014). Moreover, 
some authors point out that hazards related to climate change affecting islands are being emphasised 
too much, so that climate change distracts from other development issues (Kelman 2014). 
Consequently, views on migration as adaptation differ. Some authors (Alscher 2011; Black et al. 
2011a; Foresight 2011; Martin et al. 2014; McLeman and Smit 2006) accept this concept as a 
typical, local strategy to deal with climate change. Others (Bettini 2014; Felli and Castree 2012; 
Kelman 2015; Kelman et al. 2015) explore wider implications for people affected by climate 
change as well as uncritical assumptions of “climate migration” and of “migration as adaptation”. 
Banerjee, Black and Kniveton (2014) suggest that displacement of entire communities occurs as a 
last resort once all other adaptation possibilities have been exhausted. Foresight (2011) postulated 
that facilitating migration because of environmental change might broaden the opportunities and 
maximise the benefits from the migration process. The narrative of migration as an adaptation 
strategy has many parallels with the migration and development nexus and the debate over the 
conditions during which migration may provide a route out of poverty (Banerjee, Black and 
Kniveton 2014). 
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Much of this debate takes place within the academic literature at a conceptual level. Fewer studies 
examine perspectives and perceptions of those who have to, or who are expected to, make 
migration-related choices. This study examines local perceptions of environmental challenges 
facing Maldivians in terms of projected climate change impacts with migration as a potential 
adaptation strategy. 
The next section briefly describes Maldives’ environment and geography, followed by a section 
describing potential adaptation strategies for Maldives, including migration as a possibility. Then, 
the core of this study is presented, being empirical research with quantitative analysis of local 
perceptions of environmental change, including adaptation measures with particular attention 
devoted to migration. The final section provides wider reflections and conclusions. 
 
2. Environment and geography of Maldives 
Maldives (Fig. 1) comprises an archipelago of 1,190 islands just south of India, grouped into 26 
low-lying coral atolls. Around 200 islands are permanently inhabited and 80 more are used as 
tourist resorts. The land area totals only 298 km2, with no island larger than 10 km2. Over 80% of 
the country sits less than 1 metre above sea level (MEEW 2007; Pernetta and Sestini 1989; 
Republic of Maldives 2010; World Bank 2007). In Maldives, about 10% of the land is occupied by 
agricultural/cultivated land, 3% by forested land, 3% by pastures (MEE 2011). The soil is thin and 
of poor quality, being a maximum of about 20 centimetres deep and not too fertile, while often 
containing rock and sand. It is alkaline due to an excess of calcium from coral rock and sand. 
 
Insert Figure 1. 
Fig. 1. Maldives 
 
Maldives has a tropical climate, with the air temperature generally varying from 23-31°C and an 
annual mean temperature of 28°C. Weather is dominated by the two monsoon periods, the SW 
monsoon from May to November and the NE monsoon from January to March. Average annual 
precipitation varies regionally and increases from north to south, with the northern atolls receiving 
on average approximately 1,700 mm/year and the southern atolls receiving on average 
approximately 2,350 mm/year (Bailey, Khalil and Chatikavanij 2015). Precipitation has great inter-
annual variability, although the wettest months tend to be May, August, September, and December, 
with the driest being January to April; overall humidity ranges from 75-83% (MEEW 2007; 
Pernetta and Sestini 1989). 
A few islands have small lakes, but the main freshwater resource is in thin freshwater lenses 
underneath the land. These freshwater lenses are often heavily depleted and contaminated, as in the 
capital city of Malé, and much freshwater was salinized during the 2004 tsunami. Maldives can no 
longer rely on these freshwater lenses to satisfy their freshwater needs, due to increasing demands 
from population growth, more saltwater intrusion, increasing demand per capita including from 
tourism, and rising pollution of groundwater from sewage, industrial effluent, and poor agricultural 
practices (Bailey, Khalil and Chatikavanij 2015; Basu and Shaw 2013; Ibrahim, Bari and Miles 
2002). 
Until the 1970’s, Maldives’ economy was rather isolated and was based on fishing, shipping, and 
coconut cultivation. It changed after the advent of tourism, which has been stimulating new 
economic activities and investment. The economy remains focused on tourism and fishing, meaning 
that together with low agricultural production, it is highly dependent on imports of goods and 
services, with the economy exhibiting large fluctuations. For example, while the economy grew by 
4 
19.6% in 2006, it dropped 3.6% in 2009 due to the world financial crisis and hence reduced tourist 
numbers. But in 2010, it increased by 7.1%. Then in 2013, economic growth was 3.7% (World 
Bank 2014). Recently, the Government of Maldives has been striving to develop new economic 
sectors, such as off-port shipping services, information technology, and financial services in order 
to reduce Maldives’ current reliance on tourism (World Bank 2014). 
The country is also burdened by its high level of central government debt. While at the beginning of 
the century, the ratio of debt to GDP remained quite stable at 40% of GDP, after 2008, it grew 
rapidly and in 2011 was 73.5% of GDP (World Bank 2015). Recently, the World Bank (2014) 
classed Maldives as at “high risk” of debt distress because in 2014, the debt was around 86% of 
GDP and debt dynamics are projected to deteriorate further. 
To sum up, Maldives exemplifies the challenges and opportunities facing small island states under 
environmental change (Alexander and Mercer 2012; Dolman 1985; Hay 2013; Julca and Paddison 
2010; Kelman 2014; Lewis 1999). The distribution of the population across many islands burdens 
the public budget for infrastructure, transport, health care, social services, and education while 
providing advantages for tourism, culture, and quality of life. These baseline characteristics remain 
as climate change increasingly affects the country. 
 
3. Climate change and adaptation in Maldives 
3.1.  Adaptation strategies 
Adaptation is defined as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects” 
(IPCC 2013-2014, Glossary, 1) and is applied to Maldives in the Strategic National Action Plan for 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation (SNAP) which aims to empower four 
strategic areas from 2010-2020 for climate change risk (Republic of Maldives 2010): 
(i) an enabling environment towards good governance; 
(ii) empowered and capable communities; and 
(iii) communities with access to technology, knowledge, other resources; and 
(iv) risk-sensitive regional and local development. 
As shown in Table 1 for the coasts, hard and soft adaptation measures are often distinguished. Soft 
measures tend to be smaller-scale, less capital-intensive approaches including ecosystem-based 
adaptation such as planting mangroves and protecting coastal vegetation, compared to hard 
measures which tend to be coastal engineering and building structures such as sea walls (Sovacool 
2012). 
 
Insert Table 1. 
Table 1: Examples of hard and soft adaptation measures for coasts 
 
But which measures are best suited to offer a sustainable future for Maldives? Sovacool (2012) 
suggests that the heterogeneity and diversity of Maldives means that a single solution does not 
exist. The main dilemma is cost, in terms of who will pay for the necessary measures, including 
community consultations to ensure that the people’s ideas, views, and expertise are incorporated. 
Alexander and Mercer (2012) examine a community-based approach to ensure that options and 
decisions are thoroughly investigated and that the community has a strong say in the decision-
making process and ultimate outcome. The presumption is that donors external to Maldives would 
need to fund the work, leading to power asymmetries between Maldivians deciding what they want 
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and non-Maldivian donors potentially having their own preferences. 
So far, at the national level, several programmes and projects have been pursued, with SNAP 
(Republic of Maldives 2010) mentioned above. The National Adaptation Programme of Action 
(MEEW 2007) also set up several key areas of climate change impacts to be addressed. The first 
area deals with environmental issues such as land loss, beach erosion, threats to coral reef 
biodiversity and threats to freshwater and rainwater. The second area covers threats to infrastructure 
such as critical infrastructure, settlements, and tourist resorts. The third area relates to agriculture, 
water availability, and food security. These key areas are interconnected. For example, threats to 
freshwater sources influence agriculture, water availability, food security, and human health. 
Adaptation approaches must be long-term and connected to each other, covering environmental, 
economic, and social issues. 
Maldives also has its Safer Island Strategy and Safer Island Development Program; the term “safe 
islands” refers to Maldives’ larger islands which will theoretically be adapted to climate change 
through reclamation and other, mainly hard, measures so that people can migrate there (Islam, Hove 
and Parry 2011). Concerns about this adaptation measure include the impacts on the local 
environment, especially biodiversity, and the sensitivity of relocation as a topic, especially the 
voluntariness of moving. In 2010, another project called Integration of Climate Change Risks into 
the Maldives Safer Island Development Programme reflected transitions to and changes of 
adaptation frameworks, focusing on soft adaptation strategies, such as empowering local 
communities, using natural vegetation, and decentralizing decision-making (Elrick-Barr, Glavonic 
and Kay 2015; GEF 2009; Sovacool 2012). 
Sovacool (2012) argues that future climate change threats and some economic and development 
motivations may be among the strongest drivers for preferring hard solutions, especially relocating 
people to the new artificial islands (called “designer islands”). Hulhumalé is the most visible 
example. This island is set to be inhabited by 100,000 new inhabitants by 2030. Another example is 
Dhuvaafaru in Raa Atoll, which was re-settled in 2009 by residents from Kandolhudhoo which was 
destroyed by the 2004 tsunami (Sovacool 2012). 
Settlements and infrastructure have no choice but to be located on low-lying land near the shoreline, 
because that is all the country has. Thus, they are affected by impacts exacerbated by sea-level rise, 
including inundation, beach erosion, storm surges, and high waves. According to Shaig (2006), 
more than 42% of the population and 47% of all housing structures are within 100 metres of the 
coastline. Localised human activities contribute to the challenges, with specific problems including 
high population and housing densities, poor infrastructure, and devastation of beach vegetation. 
Several responses have been implemented, starting with individual voluntary migration and 
resettlement projects (which increased after the 2004 tsunami destroyed several Maldivian 
communities, e.g. Pardasani 2006), and land reclamation. The largest reclamation project (Shaig 
2006) is Hulhumalé, a 100% reclaimed island approximately 1.89 km2 in area. Other examples of 
partially reclaimed islands are Malé (0.82 km2, 41% of the current land area is reclaimed), 
Maamigili (0.8 km2, 51% of the current land area is reclaimed), and Hulhulé which has the 
international airport (0.76 km2, 58% of the current land area is reclaimed). 
Land reclamation as an example of a large-scale adaptation measure may exacerbate problems and 
contribute to environmental harm. Sovacool (2012), Perneta and Sestini (1989), and Perneta (1992) 
mention coastal dredging for construction of harbours and surrounding infrastructure such as 
protecting wall, breakwaters, and jetties. Creating an artificial environment can potentially 
contribute to the destruction of surrounding coral reefs, burying original lagoons and interrupting 
sediment movements. Another adaptation option remains, that of out-migration, which is further 
developed in section 3.2. 
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3.2. Out-migration as adaptation? 
Besides land reclamation as an adaptation option or staying, out-migration as an adaptation option 
for leaving is discussed. Some authors point out positive consequences of migration related to 
climate changes. Birk and Rasmussen (2014), Black et al. (2011a), and Tacoli (2009) discuss 
livelihood diversification, environmental pressures easing at home, and opportunities increasing for 
income availability—all of which support climate change adaptation. McLeman and Smit (2006) 
consider human migration as a reasonable response to environmental risk exposure, such as climate 
change. According to King et al. (2014), relocation is a strategy available to some as part of an 
extensive range of responses to extreme weather, but unsupported resettlement is not always an 
option for reasons such as family commitment, livelihood opportunities, and financial constraints. 
In fact, while many islanders have always used migration as a livelihoods and adaptation strategy, 
some typically undertake migration as a last resort when all other possibilities have been exhausted 
(Bedford and Hugo 2012; King et al. 2014; King and Connell 1999). Farbotko (2005) indicates for 
Tuvalu that non-migration adaptation strategies are more significant for island peoples faced with 
climate change than relocation and mitigation initiatives in the future. Notwithstanding the cases 
where communities have been forced to move due to climate change only, Kelman et al. (2015) 
point out that climate change does not immediately or substantively change mobility and non-
mobility choices of many living in low-lying island communities. 
Arnall and Kothari (2015) revealed some discrepancies among Maldivian attitudes to links between 
climate change and migration. They showed that many Maldivians, called “non-elites” (ordinary 
people) by the authors, did not see sea-level rise as being a sufficient reason to migrate. Conversely, 
elites were more concerned. Arnall and Kothari (2015) also noted that older interviewees preferred 
to stay where they were, but were also relatively open to the prospect of relocating, provided that 
the national government covered the costs of resettlement in full. In contrast, many younger 
interviewees viewed migration induced by climate change as a potential opportunity to secure a 
better life elsewhere. 
Meanwhile, Kumar (2014) does not consider migration from Indian Ocean islands as a solution to 
natural resource shortages and overpopulation. He applies the same judgement to planned relocation 
of whole communities elsewhere on purchased land. He argues that relocated inhabitants would not 
have electoral rights and would lose their culture and language, while potentially contributing to 
religious conflicts. 
Within this context, is migration as adaptation suitable for Maldivians? For the moment, the 
situation is not urgent because migration as adaptation may emerge from slow environmental 
degradation linked to climate change, but it could nonetheless change any day due to extreme 
weather or other sudden changes (Kelman 2015). Additionally, not all the islanders depend entirely 
on environmental resources directly, because of the large volume of imports (including bottled 
water) and the tourism-based livelihoods. Migration as adaptation is possible, but not necessarily 
essential for Maldivians, although it is important to consider whether or not internal migration 
should or could suffice for long-term adaptation. 
 
4. Methodology 
This study focuses on Maldivian perspectives on climate change impacts and migration patterns, 
examining links (or lack of links) between the two phenomena. The two main questions 
investigated are: 
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(1) How do local residents perceive the current and potential future impacts of climate change? 
(2) How might migration be considered or not considered as a potential climate change adaptation 
strategy? 
The respondent sample is taken from the capital city, the island of Malé, and the nearby residential 
islands of Villingili and Hulhumalé (Fig. 2). No assumption is made that these results are 
generalizable beyond Maldives, particularly given the cultural diversity of other island countries 
which might experience similar climate change impacts to those in Maldives, especially the 
consequences of sea-level rise. Instead, by focusing on Maldives here, we follow the call by 
Upadhyay et al. (2015) for contextualisation when investigating climate change and migration links. 
By selecting a specified geographic area for a particular study, this call has been met by the many 
others studies of islands, climate change, and migration including for the Marshall Islands (Rudiak-
Gould 2013) and Tuvalu (Shen and Gemenne 2011). 
Insert Figure 2. 
Fig. 2. North Malé Atoll and detail of Malé, Villingili, Hulhumalé islands 
 
Our questionnaires focused on respondents’ perceptions of environmental threats, climate change, 
livelihood conditions, and migration intentions and patterns using quantitative closed questions. 
Four main question clusters were used: 
(i) household and demographic characteristics; 
(ii) current living conditions; 
(iii) perceptions of socio-economic and environmental changes; and 
(iv) migration patterns, tendencies, and perceptions of migration due to future sea-level rise 
impacts. 
We completed 347 questionnaires from August-November 2013 via face-to-face interviews. The 
researcher asked a household member on the street or in any public space to participate and the 
researcher completed the questionnaire with the respondent. This method ensured the possibilities 
of explaining those questions which were not clear to respondents, and obtaining additional 
responses, personal opinions, and other pertinent information related to each specific response. The 
respondents were guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality. 
For selecting respondents, we aimed for as wide a range of age, education, and employment as 
possible, but only respondents aged eighteen years or older. Because of the geographical focus of 
the survey, the sample is not representative of the population of Maldives as a whole. We report 
standard logit models (logistic regression) for statistical analysis (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
 
5. Findings and discussion 
5.1. Perceptions and understandings of environmental change impacts 
The questionnaire investigated respondents' experience with extreme weather conditions and their 
ways of dealing with these, and their experiences of any changes in weather patterns. This section 
addresses these perceptions if weather and climate for all respondents. Respondents were given a 
questionnaire investigating respondents’ experience with extreme weather, their responses, and their 
experiences with any changes in weather patterns. 
More than 60% of all respondents had experienced extreme natural hazards in the past, the majority 
of them referring to the 2004 tsunami, while recognizing that the tsunami was not linked to climate 
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change. To deal with such experiences, of the respondents who had experienced extreme natural 
hazards, almost 17% mentioned house reconstruction and 13% mentioned migration. Other 
structural measures (e.g. sea walls and drainage systems) were mentioned by 11% of respondents. 
More than 40% of respondents did not suggest any measures. The rest of the respondents mentioned 
other approaches including government subsidies and international aid. While not implying that 
climate change causes or would cause tsunamis, the respondents tended to assume that climate 
change impacts would be similar to their tsunami experience. 
In the context of climate variability and weather changes, 71% of respondents had observed some 
shifts and changes in weather patterns within the past 10-15 years. Just 8% had not observed any 
changes, while the remainder had not noticed. From the entire sample of respondents, 53% 
perceived summer monsoons to be hotter today, and 31% perceived them to be coming sooner. 
Meanwhile, winter monsoons were hotter (48%) with less rain (38%). From the 247 respondents 
who observed some changes in weather within the previous 10-15 years, 31% were members of a 
household in which at least one person had a university degree, 24% came from households 
including at least one person with a college diploma, and 15% came from households with only 
secondary school education. 
Table 2 shows that 37% of all respondents worried about environmental challenges, such as lack of 
space for living and population growth (18%), climate variability or dry weather and water 
shortages (9%), and impacts of sea-level rise and soil erosion (7%). The perception of other future 
challenges such as job availability (10%), higher crime rates (4%), political instability and conflicts 
(5%), and low quality of healthcare and education (4%) were not considered to be as serious as 
environmental concerns. 
This outcome is likely to be due to the high awareness and political priority of environmental 
topics, as well as the strong international perception of Maldives as being highly impacted by 
climate change, to the degree that Maldives has become an icon for these impacts. Nevertheless, the 
environmental concerns highlighted have direct impact on day-to-day lives, whereas the other 
topics do not necessarily, to the same level. For example, water shortages and coastal erosion are 
environmental concerns that directly impact day-to-day life on small islands. Lack of space due to 
the high population density cannot be escaped, so it is a frequent topic of discussion in the streets 
and at higher political levels. 
Meanwhile, Maldives has suffered from political instability for several years leading to street 
violence and arrests for treason. Yet rates of petty crime and day-to-day criminal acts are low. 
Additionally, some violations of human rights such as domestic, sexual, and gender-based violence, 
while fluctuating substantially in recent years (Fulu 2014), might not always be assumed to be a 
crime in Maldivian (or many Western) societies, whether or not the law forbids them. 
Consequently, crime rates may not be seen as a major concern, in line with respondents’ views. The 
low rates of concern for political instability and health/education quality are surprising, but the 
location of the interviews might account for this result. Those living in Malé have access to the best 
health care and education in the country, so locally, this topic might be of less concern. Similarly, 
while national politics is highly contentious in the country and is always a topic for discussions in 
the street, its impact on day-to-day life is less than some of the other concerns raised. 
 
Insert Table 2. 
Table 2: Respondents’ perceptions of challenges 
 
5.2. Migration patterns – descriptive analyses 
From the perspective of respondents who have already been internal migrants, improved education, 
9 
livelihoods, and living conditions are the decisive factors for migrating, mentioned by 44% of 
respondents who moved from other islands to Malé. Just 2% of these respondents suggested poor 
environmental conditions or natural hazards. Socio-economic factors dominate internal migration 
decisions. 
49% of respondents plan to move abroad, migrating either temporarily or permanently. The main 
reasons are seeking improved health care, education, and living conditions (26%) followed by 
family reasons, nationality, and religion (20%). Environmental reasons—specifically sea-level rise 
and soil erosion, climate variability, overpopulation, and lack of living space—were mentioned by 
13% of respondents. Prevailing factors motivating the respondents to move away remain socio-
economic. On the other hand, environmental factors play a more important role in respondents’ 
decision-making to leave Maldives compared to internal migration to Malé. 
Just 10% of respondents from households with university degrees mentioned these environmental 
reasons, while 13% with college diplomas and 14% with only secondary education mentioned 
environmental reasons. Nobody mentioned dry weather or water shortages as a possible reason for 
migrating. Household education level appears to make little difference to views of environmental 
reasons for migrating. 
Little academic literature exists on internal migration within Maldives. One of the most detailed 
studies (Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell 1987) is also rather outdated, being published before climate 
change had such a large political influence and highlighting livelihood reasons as the principal 
factor for internal migration. Kothari (2014) provides an historical account of central government 
policies regarding internal migration in Maldives. For decades, the government has been trying to 
consolidate the population from outer islands to a small number of islands on which larger 
communities would be built. Originally, the government’s reason for population consolidation was 
given as economic sustainability and provision of social services. Now, the government’s reason for 
population consolidation is given as climate change. Consequently, the top-down discourse for 
internal migration has been changing, but so far, the consolidation policy has not been 
implemented. In terms of the wider literature on islander mobility (e.g. Baldacchino 2007; Guan 
and McElroy 2012; Kelman et al. 2015, King and Connell 1999), internal migration—primarily 
from outer islands or rural areas to the capital—is common, with the main reasons being better 
education, livelihoods, and living conditions, exactly as for Maldives. The data here provide new 
insights from Maldives, matching well with previous studies on islander mobility. 
Respondents mentioned various preferred destinations and regions for migrating. We defined 
clusters to evaluate the main destination regions, differentiated geographically and economically. 
Cluster 1 consists of more economically developed countries, but rather distant from Maldives, such 
as the European Union and the USA. Cluster 2 comprises Asian countries located comparatively 
close geographically and culturally to Maldives, mainly India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
Cluster 3 consists of two more economically developed countries, Australia and New Zealand. 
Cluster 4 indicates internal migration within Maldives. 
Respondents prefer to migrate anywhere (19%) and to relatively close Asian countries (20%) (Table 
3). Of the more developed countries, respondents prefer Cluster 3 (19%) followed by Cluster 1 
(9%)—but the USA was mentioned by only two household members, presumably because the 
country is far from Maldives and popular entertainment depictions of the country tend to 
demonstrate vast cultural differences from Maldives. The pattern of response is that locations 
nearer, and perceived to be more culturally similar to Maldives, are preferred migration 
destinations, which is to be expected. 
 
Insert Table 3. 
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Table 3: Preferred migration destinations by destination cluster and education level 
 
Countries relatively close to Maldives prevail as the main out-migration destinations (Table 3). 
Respondents prefer to move to Australia (17%), Malaysia (8%), Sri Lanka (4%), and India (3%). 
The sums from Table 3 do not correspond because some respondents mentioned more than one 
destination from different clusters. 
 
When we compare levels of education in the household and migration destination, we find some 
differences. About 32% of respondents from households with university education prefer migration 
to another Maldivian island (10%) or to Asia (22%), especially to Malaysia (9%), Sri Lanka (4%), 
and India (3%). Meanwhile, more than 18% of these respondents prefer to move to Australia. As for 
respondents from households with only secondary school education level, they prefer to migrate to 
other Maldivian islands (22%) or move to other Asian countries such as India (4%), Malaysia (9%), 
and Sri Lanka (4%)—and to Australia (15%), New Zealand (2%), and the USA (1%) (Table 3). 
 
17 respondents who chose environmental reasons for migrating prefer to move to Australia and 
New Zealand (Table 4). Meanwhile, preferred destinations of respondents choosing social and 
economic reasons are almost equal among three clusters (Europe-USA, Asia, and Australia-New 
Zealand). 
 
Insert Table 4. 
Table 4: Reasons for migrating according to destination cluster 
 
Table 5 provides respondents’ opinions on out-migration of the whole Maldivian population due to 
sea-level rise in the future. Just under half of the respondents suggested future out-migration as a 
potential, or necessary survival strategy, with most of this group stating that out-migration will be 
necessary. A handful considered it to be a future possibility. Nearly one quarter of respondents did 
not agree, either because they do not believe that it could happen (the majority view) or that 
adaptation would be possible (a minority view). 
Despite the prevalence of the external construction that Maldivians will need to be evacuated due to 
sea-level rise, internal views are more varied but less nonchalant than other examinations (Arnall 
and Kothari 2015; Kothari 2014). The existence of a substantial minority countering the external, 
top-down constructions of inevitably disappearing islands matches findings from other low-lying 
atolls which have also been said to be threatened with evacuation due to sea-level rise. Tuvalu 
(Farbotko 2005; McCubbin, Smit and Pearce 2015) and Kiribati (Gaillard 2012) are particularly 
pertinent in that, similarly to the findings reported here, other issues dominate the climate change 
agenda locally. Notable among these other issues are day-to-day livelihood concerns, meaning that 
people are, understandably, less inclined to think about large-scale changes such as mass migration 
under the hazy future of climate change projections. Yet the view in Maldives differs from that in 
these other studies, since a large majority suggested that Maldives will need to move due to sea-
level rise. The most likely reason is that respondents living in the capital generally have higher 
educational levels and greater exposure to external views. 
 
Insert Table 5. 
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Table 5: Respondents’ opinions on Maldivians moving en masse in response to sea-level rise 
 
5.3. Determinants of migration patterns 
Respondents were asked about their intentions to move away from their home location and about 
their opinion on the “need to move” strategy. In the previous section, some descriptive statistics 
were presented. Here, the questions are addressed regarding (i) which factors stand behind their 
decision to move? and (ii) which factors might influence households’ opinions that future out-
migration is a necessary strategy to deal with the changes in the weather and climate? Both 
questions may be answered using binary outcome models, i.e. models with binary dependent 
variables. In this study, a standard logit model (logistic regression) is used. Out of the 347 
respondents, 295 could be used for analysis, because of missing values for some explanatory 
variables in the remainder. The explanatory variables represent various socio-demographic 
characteristics of the respondents as well as their experiences with weather changes and perceptions 
of climate change. The results presented contain only the statistically significant variables. 
As for the factors influencing household migration patterns, 159 respondents intended to migrate 
and 136 did not. Table 6 presents maximum likelihood estimates of the model where the dependent 
variable was based on the respondents’ decisions (or intentions) to move away. As a measure of 
goodness of fit, the percentage of correctly classified cases was computed. The percentage of 
correctly classified cases (e.g. respondent answered “yes” and the model predicts “yes”) is 68.3%. 
This model is thus considerably better that a purely random model and all the identified factors have 
the power to discriminate between those who would like to migrate and those who would not. 
 
Insert Table 6. 
Table 6: Model – Factors influencing migration patterns 
 
The signs of estimated regression coefficients in Table 6 indicate the direction of influence of the 
underlying variables. The probability to migrate increases with the maximum education level of 
household members, perhaps because more education exposes respondents’ to different ideas, 
lessening the fear of other locations while increasing their curiosity. Additionally, many Maldivians 
leave their country for higher education and then return, meaning that they have ties and experience 
elsewhere, making it easier to contemplate again migration outside their country. 
Social and environmental threats are important factors influencing decisions to migrate. Households 
facing higher social and environmental threats, or with increasing subjective perception of weather 
changes, are more likely to intend to migrate than those facing lower threat levels. Regarding the 
negative signs on the quadratic terms, these positive effects on probability to migrate are 
diminishing in both the mentioned cases. The positive coefficient on the last variable (indicating the 
respondents’ opinion about the “need to move” strategy) suggests that the decision to migrate is 
tightly connected with their opinion about the “need to move” strategy. This result is important, 
demonstrating that views can translate into action, rather than people simply expressing an opinion 
with no intention of ever acting on it. 
As for the factors determining opinion about the “need to move” strategy, 160 respondents agreed 
with “the need to move because of weather changes” and 135 respondents disagreed. The maximum 
likelihood estimates are presented in Table 7. This model is able to classify correctly 72.8% of 
observed cases. 
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Insert Table 7. 
Table 7: Model – Factors influencing the opinion about “need to move” strategy 
 
From Table 7, it can be seen that households living longer in their place of residence tend to agree 
with the “need to move” strategy less than households living there for a shorter time period. Older 
respondents tend to agree with the strategy to out-migrate less than younger ones. In examining 
migration, an assumption is often that younger people are more adventurous and willing to accept 
change, so they would be predisposed towards migration more than the older generation. Yet the 
migration literature has long accepted and explored multiple reasons for older people wanting to 
move and deciding to migrate (e.g. Litwak and Longino 1987, Wiseman 1980). Out of the multitude 
of reasons for older people supporting migration, the Maldivians might be demonstrating an 
impetus of parents seeking better lives for their children and grandchildren especially given their 
worries about the future. Additionally, the older people have experienced more good times and 
more bad times than younger generations, giving the older people a reason to push for a better life. 
This discussion reaffirms the need for those exploring climate change migration to include more 
insights and understandings from the wider migration literature. 
Regarding the quadratic term in Table 7, this negative effect is diminishing in absolute terms. To be 
more specific, the age of 45 represents the point where negative effects change for positive ones. 
The main possible explanations intersect with the many reasons for older people seeking to migrate 
(e.g. Litwak and Longino 1987, Wiseman 1980) such as moving to be with their children, wishing 
to be closer to good health care facilities, and decline in or loss of livelihoods. All three factors in 
Maldives tend to mean moving to Malé, which is where the questionnaire was implemented. 
Further important factors in respondents’ opinions on the overall necessity to migrate which 
emerged are negative experiences with environmental change and the apparent (or assumed) rise in 
resulting damage. As the results in Table 7 suggest, negative experiences increase the probability 
that the household will agree with the “need to move” strategy. This result is not surprising in that 
negative experiences would be expected to spur on a need for or interest in changing one’s location. 
This finding conforms with evidence from wider literature showing that environmental trends with 
detrimental impacts can lead to migration choices, although many are left behind because they 
cannot afford to move or feel that they have no option of moving (Felli and Castree 2012; Foresight 
2011). Respondents to this question in Maldives are demonstrating migration as adaptation to 
negative experiences with environmental change, seeking the advantages which the literature 
reports (Birk and Rasmussen 2014; Black et al. 2011a; Tacoli 2009). 
Respondents knowing people who had moved away, but whose final destinations were unknown or 
to Asia tend to agree with the “need to move” strategy” more than those who know people who had 
moved elsewhere or who had stayed in Malé. According to the respondents, those moving to 
Europe, the UK, the USA, Australia, or New Zealand are moving there mostly for better education, 
or because they had already received better education and wished to use it to obtain better jobs. The 
decision to migrate to these countries may thus influence others regarding the need (or desirability) 
to move. This effect is found frequently in the mobilities literature, where non-migrants are more 
inclined to consider migration when they know someone who has left, and to prefer destinations 
where they know people already or where others have already lived (e.g. Bedford and Hugo 2012; 
Epstein and Gang 2006). 
This behaviour has three important implications. First, educated young people deciding to migrate 
abroad will negatively influence the average educational level of the Maldivian labour force. 
Second, the older generation might choose to or feel obliged to follow the younger generation, to be 
with their children and grandchildren, as alluded to above. Third, the observed migration tendencies 
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may result from positive migration experience of relatives or friends (see also Epstein and Gang 
2006), not just perceived environmental reasons. These patterns match the patterns expressed in the 
migration and mobilities literature referenced throughout, indicating that climate change might not 
(yet) bring much which is new to the decision-making processes of Maldivians considering whether 
or not to migrate. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Although sea-level rise is a major projected climate change impact for Maldives and is perceived by 
Maldivians to be a concern, it is disputable if ongoing adaptation measures are sufficient to enable 
the country and its people to deal with its projected futures. Although a set of various adaptation 
measures is being considered and some are being implemented—such as sea walls, land 
reclamation, beach vegetation, relocation, warning systems, and whole-island elevation changes—
uncertainties about future climate change and its impacts remain. Even though it is not perceived or 
experienced as an everyday reality in and around Malé, the future climate change threat and out-
migration option have, to some extent, become slowly rooted in people’s minds—at least to the 
point where they consider it even if their migration-related motivations still remain with other 
factors. 
Regarding migration as adaptation, contrary to Arnall and Kothari (2015), who seem to 
underestimate ordinary people’s perceptions of climate change and find that they focus more on 
everyday livelihood challenges than on long-term solutions, a comparatively high proportion of our 
respondents was familiar with the potential necessity for out-migration and the possible climate 
change links. Yet awareness of these links and ability to discuss them do not necessarily directly 
influence actual opinions and decisions. The reason is that expressed views occur in the context that 
Maldivians are already migrating out of Maldives—and have long done so—without considering 
climate change. Reasons for migrating encompass education, health care, social position, politics, 
jobs, and livelihoods (Kelegema 2011; Kothari 2014; Sathiendrakumar and Tisdell 1987). This 
situation is not unique to Maldives, but occurs in many other small island states, with migration 
having been an important component of life and livelihoods since these islands were first settled 
(Bedford and Hugo 2012;  Kelman et al. 2015; Le De et al. 2015; Rudiak-Gould 2013; Shen and 
Gemenne 2011; Stojanov et al. 2014). 
Nevertheless, these findings do not imply that Maldivians see out-migration as an easy or desirable 
adaptation measure. As the results outlined above and the discussion show, other adaptation 
measures are considered and many would prefer to implement these first, rather than prioritising 
migration with respect to climate change. The ongoing efforts to implement development processes 
in Maldives (e.g. Alexander and Mercer 2012; MEEW 2007, van Alphen, Kekkert and van Sark 
2008) demonstrate the efforts put into keeping the country viable for lives and livelihoods. This 
situation matches similar efforts in many other small island states where development work not 
related to climate change can continue in parallel with climate change adaptation measures, 
sometimes being complementary (e.g. for Seychelles, Mercer et al. 2014) and sometimes causing 
tensions (e.g. for Kiribati, Gaillard 2012). 
Overall, it appears as if Maldives is aiming to adapt to projected climate change impacts with a 
combination of hard and soft measures, neither just implementing stop-gap measures nor 
abandoning the country (Elrick-Barr, Glavonic and Kay 2015; MEEW 2007; Republic of Maldives 
2010; Sovacool 2012). Moreover, Maldivians in the capital area are reasonably well-informed and 
have a knowledge baseline covering ongoing and future climate change impacts, as well as possible 
responses to those impacts, of which migration is certainly an option. None of this significantly 
impacts Maldivians’ views of or interests in migrating, but decisions will be based primarily on 
reasons other than climate change. 
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Thus, migration as adaptation has traction among Maldivians in Malé, but is not considered to be a 
principal or desired option. This attitude matches two main threads in the “migration as adaptation” 
literature discussed in section 3.2. First, migration as adaptation is a viable option, and has 
advantages, but may often be implemented in conjunction with other measures. Second, migration 
as adaptation does not mean forced or involuntary migration, so those migrating would not wish to 
be labelled as “climate refugees” or “climate change refugees”. Irrespective of the combination of 
adaptation measures ultimately adopted, they should not be implemented in a top-down fashion but, 
as suggested by Alexander and Mercer (2012), ordinary Maldivians must be included in wider 
discussions about future trajectories of their livelihoods and homeland. 
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Table 1: Examples of hard and soft adaptation measures for coasts 
Climate change 
impact 
Hard measure Soft measure 
Sea-level rise Construction of sea walls and 
tetra pods. 
Mangrove afforestation and beach 
nourishment. 
Water scarcity Desalinization of water Capturing rainwater 
Saltwater intrusion Elevated water tanks and storage 
systems 
Thickening coastal vegetation 
Tidal inundation Land reclamation Dune replenishment 
Community relocation Construction of artificial or 
designer islands 
Coral propagation and protection 
around existing islands 
Source: Adapted from Sovacool (2012). 
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Table 2: Respondents’ perceptions of challenges 
Challenges Relative frequency 
0. Not able to specify any challenges 10.09% 
1. Environmental change 37.18% 
 - sea-level rise and soil erosion                              7.20% 
 - lack of space and population growth                            17.87% 
 - dry weather and water shortage                               3.75% 
 - climate variability                               5.48% 
 - pollution of environment                               2.88% 
2. Job availability 10.37% 
3. Higher crime rates 3.75% 
4. Political instability, conflicts 4.61% 
5. Low quality of health care and education  4.03% 
6. Others 29.97% 
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Table 3: Preferred migration destinations by destination cluster and education level 
Destination 
Total 
(percentage) 
Secondary and higher 
education* 
(percentage) 
University education** 
(percentage) 
Unknown 25.68% 25.61% 27.63% 
Anywhere 18.58% 15.85% 23.68% 
Cluster 1: Europe, USA 8.74% 7.32% 7.89% 
 France 1.09% 1.22% 1.32% 
 Germany 1.09% 1.22% 1.32% 
 Ireland 0.55% 0.00% 0.00% 
 Russia 1.09% 2.44% 0.00% 
 Switzerland 0.55% 0.00% 0.00% 
 United 
 Kingdom 
2.73% 1.22% 2.63% 
 USA 1.09% 1.22% 0.00% 
Cluster 2: Asia 19.67% 19.51% 22.37% 
 India 3.28% 3.66% 2.63% 
 Malaysia 8.20% 8.54% 9.21% 
 Qatar 0.55% 0.00% 1.32% 
 Singapore 2.73% 2.44% 3.95% 
 Sri Lanka 3.83% 3.66% 3.95% 
 Turkey 0.55% 1.22% 0.00% 
Cluster 3: Australia, New 
Zealand 
18.58% 17.07% 18.42% 
 Australia 16.94% 14.63% 17.11% 
 New Zealand 1.64% 2.44% 1.32% 
Cluster 4: Maldives 14.21% 21.95% 10.53% 
TOTAL (respondents) 183 82 76 
Notes: Percentages are computed from the ratio of respondents preferring the corresponding 
destination Cluster to the total of all respondents intending to migrate (column 2), or the sub-totals 
with different education levels in columns 3 and 4. Column totals do not sum to 100% because 
multiple responses were allowed. 
* Households with at least one member with a college diploma 
** Households with at least one member with a bachelor degree or higher 
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Table 4: Reasons for migrating according to destination cluster 
 Intended destination 
Reasons Unknown Anywhere 
Cluster 1: 
Europe, 
USA 
Cluster 
2: Asia 
Cluster 3: 
Australia, 
New Zealand 
Cluster 4: 
Maldives 
Better education, 
livelihoods, and 
living conditions 
44.68% 79.41% 87.50% 69.44% 61.76% 26.92% 
Environmental 
conditions, disasters 
and sea-level rise 
31.91% 23.53% 0.00% 11.11% 50.00% 15.38% 
Other 40.43% 14.71% 12.50% 27.78% 26.47% 61.54% 
Total (respondents) 47 34 16 36 34 26 
Note: Percentages are computed from the ratio of respondents mentioned the corresponding reason 
to the total of all respondents preferring the corresponding destination Cluster. Column totals do not 
sum to 100% because multiple responses were allowed. 
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Table 5: Respondents’ opinions on Maldivians moving en masse in response to sea-level rise 
Respondents’ opinions Frequency Percentages 
Do not know 21 6.05% 
Yes, agree, we will have to move 166 47.84% 
Not now, but perhaps in the future 11 3.17% 
Yes, some islands, but not Maldives 
as whole 
2 0.58% 
No, disagree, do not believe 61 17.58% 
It is necessary to adapt 18 5.19% 
Indecisive 3 0.87% 
No answer 65 18.72% 
TOTAL 347 100.00% 
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Table 6: Model – Factors influencing migration patterns 
Variable 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
p-value 
Intercept -3.7159 1.2248 0.0024 
X1 0.2493 0.145 0.0856 
X2 0.2092 0.1009 0.038 
X2 squared -0.00441 0.00254 0.0829 
X3 0.1537 0.1832 0.4015 
X3 squared -0.0402 0.0274 0.1423 
X4  1.0197 0.252 0.0000 
Notes: p-values are based on the Wald chi-squared test statistics for the hypothesis test that an individual 
predictor's regression coefficient is zero given the rest of the predictors in the model. The variables were 
selected using a stepwise regression approach with probabilities (p-values) 0.3 to enter into the model and 
0.15 to stay in the model. Statistical significance of squared variables was evaluated jointly with the 
significance of the corresponding level (non-squared) variable. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if 
the respondent intended to move away and 0 if not. Statistically significant variables are: 
X1 = maximum educational level of the household members (1 – illiterate, 2 - can read and write, 3 - 
elementary school, 4 - secondary school, 5 - high school, 6 - bachelor degree or higher). 
X2 = variable expressing the evaluation of social and environmental living conditions computed as the sum 
on subjective scale (from 1 - OK, no danger, across 3 - middle threat, to 5 - the worst, with 2 and 4 
representing values in between) for 6 categories: crime, air pollution, rubbish outside, lack of potable water, 
dirty sea water, and the environment generally. 
X3 = variable expressing the number of weather changes that were noticed by the respondent. It is based on 
the sum of the number of answers “yes” to particular changes in the wet season (summer monsoons) and the 
dry season (in winter) These particular changes included options that summer monsoons and the winter dry 
season are coming sooner or later; that they are hotter or colder; and that there is more rain or less rain. 
X4 = dummy variable expressing the respondent’s opinion about the “need to move” strategy. This variable 
equals 1 where the household agreed with the need to move and equals 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7: Model – Factors influencing the opinion about “need to move” strategy 
Variable 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
error 
p-value 
Intercept 1.2214 1.0558 0.2473 
X1 -0.0244 0.0106 0.0206 
X2 -0.1107 0.0605 0.0672 
X2 squared 0.00122 0.000803 0.1288 
X3 -1.9829 1.1538 0.0857 
X4 0.8663 0.282 0.0021 
X5 -0.6324 0.3966 0.1108 
X6 0.8039 0.3288 0.0145 
X7 0.5389 0.3153 0.0874 
X8 0.0267 0.0101 0.0084 
Notes: model fitting procedures are as defined in the caption to Table 6. Statistically significant variables 
were: 
X1 = number of years the respondent has been living at his or her place of residence. 
X2 = age of the respondent. 
X3 = dummy variable equals 1 if the respondent comes from abroad, and 0 otherwise (the basic category is 
the respondent coming from other places than abroad). 
X4 = dummy variable defined using the answers to the question “do you intend to move away?”. It equals 1 
if the answer is “yes” and zero otherwise. 
X5 = dummy variable equals 1 if the household intends to move away but does not know where and 0 
otherwise (the basic category is households knowing the destination where to move or intending not to 
move). 
X6 = dummy variable equals 1 if the household knows the people who had moved away but the destination 
was unknown and 0 otherwise (the basic category is households knowing the people who had moved to 
Europe, USA, UK, Australia or New Zealand, or elsewhere in Malé). 
X7 = dummy variable equals 1 if the household knows people who had moved away and their destination 
was Asia and 0 otherwise (the basic category is households knowing people who had moved to Europe, 
USA, UK, Australia or New Zealand, or elsewhere in Malé). 
X8 = variable expressing the level of negative environmental changes around the place where the lives. It is 
computed as a sum of level of damages (on a scale from 1 - OK, no danger, across 3 - middle threat, to 5 - 
the worst, with 2 and 4 representing values in between) experienced by the respondent connected with 11 
kinds of changes (number of trees, fisheries, rapid urbanization, sea water pollution, lack of drinking water, 
factory-based industry, air pollution, destruction of nature, rapid increase in the amount of tourists, beach 
erosion, other disturbances). 
